Cheryl Rung v. Pittsburgh Associates by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-12-2013 
Cheryl Rung v. Pittsburgh Associates 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Cheryl Rung v. Pittsburgh Associates" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1234. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1234 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 11-4204 
__________ 
 
CHERYL L. RUNG; PETER RUNG, her husband, 
  
v. 
 
PITTSBURGH ASSOCIATES, LP, dba THE PITTSBURGH PIRATES, 
    
C.B. RICHARD ELLIS/PITTSBURGH, LP, 
                          Appellants 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-00670) 
District Judge: Hon. Gary L. Lancaster 
__________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 11, 2013 
 
Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, and STARK,

 District Judge. 
 
 (Filed: February 12, 2013) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
          
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
                                              

 Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Judge of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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Cheryl and Peter Rung sued Pittsburgh Associates and CB Richard Ellis 
(hereinafter “CBRE”) for injuries sustained when Cheryl Rung slipped and fell on the 
floor of a restroom at PNC Park, a baseball stadium located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 
the home of the Pittsburgh Pirates. Pittsburgh Associates owns the Pirates.
1
 CBRE 
manages the stadium for the Pirates, and is responsible for maintenance of all public 
areas of the stadium, including public restrooms. The Pirates and CBRE each contested 
liability in the personal injuries case and cross-claimed against each other for contribution 
and indemnification. The Rungs settled the slip-and-fall claim with the Pirates and 
CBRE, but the cross-claims for indemnity remain as the subject of the present litigation. 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Pirates. CBRE appeals. We will reverse and remand. 
I. 
 The Pirates and CBRE entered into a written Facilities Maintenance and Leasing 
Agreement dated February 27, 2007 (the “FMLA”). Two indemnification provisions 
contained in the FMLA‟s Article IX control the disposition of the indemnity cross-
claims. The first relevant provision is § 9.1, Manager‟s Indemnity: 
9.1 Manager‟s Indemnity. Without limiting any indemnity provided 
elsewhere in this Agreement, [CBRE] shall indemnify, defend, protect and 
hold harmless [Pirates] and [Pirates‟] Representative . . . from and against 
all claims, losses and liabilities . . . which arise out of (a) any breach of this 
Agreement by [CBRE], (b) any act of [CBRE] which is outside the scope of 
[CBRE‟s] authority under this Agreement, or (c) the professional 
negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, willful misconduct, fraud or 
criminal acts of [CBRE] . . . . 
App. 231 (emphasis in original). CBRE contends that § 9.1, Manager‟s Indemnity 
imposes a duty on it to indemnify the Pirates only if that paid loss arises out of CBRE‟s 
                                              
1 
We will refer to Pittsburgh Associates as the Pirates throughout this opinion. 
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professional negligence or gross negligence, not simple negligence. The other relevant 
provision is § 9.2, Team‟s Indemnity: 
9.2 Team‟s Indemnity. Team shall indemnify, defend, protect and hold 
harmless [CBRE] . . . from and against all claims, losses and liabilities . . .  
which arise out of the performance by [CBRE] of its obligations and duties 
hereunder unless the claim, loss or liability arises from (a) any breach of 
this Agreement by [CBRE], (b) any act of [CBRE] which is outside the 
scope of [CBRE‟s] authority under this Agreement, or (c) the professional 
negligence, active negligence (except for [CBRE‟s] negligence which is 
covered under Team‟s Commercial General Liability [CGL] Insurance), 
recklessness, willful misconduct, fraud or criminal acts of [CBRE] . . . . 
App. 231. 
The District Court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Pirates and denying CBRE‟s motion for summary judgment, and awarded the Pirates 
$52,168.91.
2
 The Judgment encompassed the Pirates‟ contribution to the settlement plus 
interest, as well as those attorneys‟ fees and costs which were to be awarded to the 
prevailing party under the terms of the FMLA. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the original suit by Rung against CBRE 
and the Pirates pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as Rung is a domiciliary of Florida and 
CBRE and the Pirates are both domiciled in Pennsylvania. The District Court had 
jurisdiction over the cross-claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and retained jurisdiction 
over those cross-claims after settlement of the underlying lawsuit. See Fairview Park 
Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo Constr. Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1125-1126 (3d Cir. 1977). We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
  
                                              
2
 On October 20, 2011, the District Court awarded the Pirates $40,913.91. On November 
18, 2011, the District Court amended the judgment and awarded the Pirates an additional 
$11,255.00 in attorneys‟ fees, for a total award of $52,168.91. 
3
 We exercise plenary review over a trial court‟s grant of a motion for summary judgment 
and apply the same standard that the district court applies. Dilworth v. Metro. Life Ins. 
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III. 
The District Court concluded that “the Rungs‟ allegation that CBRE acted 
recklessly [was] determinative under the terms of the FMLA,” because “[t]he FMLA 
clearly and unequivocally states that if a claim arises out of CBRE‟s „recklessness,‟ then 
CBRE has a duty to indemnify the Pirates.” App. 7-8. The District Court determined that 
the allegation of recklessness by the Rungs obligated CBRE to indemnify, 
notwithstanding that “neither party acknowledge[d] it.” App. 8.  
CBRE contends that neither party briefed the issue of recklessness before the 
District Court because the concept of recklessness is inapplicable to the parties‟ dispute. 
We do not agree that the concept of recklessness is inapplicable to the dispute, but we do 
agree that the District Court incorrectly concluded that the Rungs‟ mere allegation of 
recklessness means that, under the terms of the FMLA, CBRE must indemnify the 
Pirates. Under § 9.1, CBRE must indemnify the Pirates for claims, losses or liabilities 
which arise out of CBRE‟s recklessness.  
The parties agree that principles of insurance law are analogous and applicable to 
the dispute before this Court. Accordingly, we observe that under Pennsylvania law, the 
term “arising out of” denotes a “[b]ut for” or a “cause and result relationship.” Allstate 
Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Squires, 667 F.3d 388, 391 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Mfrs. Cas. 
Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 170 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. 1961)). Pennsylvania law 
incorporates the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition for the state of mind of 
recklessness:  
                                                                                                                                                  
Co., 418 F.3d 345, 349 (3d Cir. 2005). All evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party and all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor. 
Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). Summary judgment should 
be granted only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The actor‟s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he 
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other 
to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially 
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.  
Archibold v. Kemble, 971 A.2d 513, 519 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 500 (1965)).  Comment g to Section 500 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts describes the difference between negligence and recklessness: 
g. Negligence and recklessness contrasted. Reckless misconduct differs 
from negligence in several important particulars. It differs from that form of 
negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence, 
unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions to enable the actor adequately 
to cope with a possible or probable future emergency, in that reckless 
misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action, either with 
knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge 
of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. It differs 
not only from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but also from that 
negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with knowledge that 
it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be reckless must 
recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater in amount 
than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. The difference 
between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a quantum 
of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in the degree of 
the risk, but this difference of degree is so marked as to amount 
substantially to a difference in kind. 
IV. 
The District Court examined the Rungs‟ complaint, as well as §§ 9.1 and 9.2 of the 
FMLA, and determined that “[b]ecause the Rungs‟ complaint alleges that CBRE acted 
recklessly, CBRE has a duty to indemnify the Pirates under the FMLA.” App. 7. The 
District Court stated that “the Rungs‟ allegation that CBRE acted recklessly is 
determinative under the terms of the FMLA.” App. 8.  
For CBRE to incur the duty to indemnify the Pirates for a claim that “arises 
from . . . recklessness . . . of [CBRE],” FMLA § 9.2, it would seem that the underlying 
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facts of the events leading to Rung‟s injury must be found or conceded. In CBRE‟s 
response to the Concise Statement of Material Facts that the Pirates submitted in support 
of their motion for summary judgment, CBRE admitted to the content of Rung‟s 
testimony, but not to the underlying statements made by Rung:
4
 
15. Rung testified that as she entered the restroom, she observed that the 
floor was shiny and that there was water on the floor. She told her sister to 
“be careful.” Rung testified that there were bigger puddles, smaller puddles 
everywhere and that the water was substantial. 
16. Rung testified that she avoided the water as she walked into a 
bathroom stall and the area of the floor within the stall was dry. 
17. Upon leaving the stall, Rung took a step towards the sink across 
from the stall when she slipped and fell. 
18. Rung thought she was stepping out onto a dry area of the floor but 
believes she stepped into water when she slipped. 
App. 103.  
Rung‟s testimony must be measured against the controlling  precept of 
recklessness: whether CBRE “[knew] or ha[d] reason to know of facts which would lead 
a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is 
necessary to make his conduct negligent.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500. It is 
necessary for a fact finder to determine whether the conduct underlying the Rungs‟ 
complaint and allegations satisfies the recklessness standard under Pennsylvania law. 
The Pirates, in apparent recognition that CBRE‟s conduct may not have actually 
been reckless, contend that after the Rungs alleged recklessness, CBRE became obligated 
to defend the Pirates, and that their failure to do so estops them from denying 
indemnification to the Pirates. Before the District Court, in their briefing in support of 
                                              
4
 For ease of reading, we do not present CBRE‟s responses above, but note that CBRE 
admitted statements 15 and 16, and as for statements 17 and 18, admitted only that the 
statements reflected Rung‟s testimony. 
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their motion for summary judgment, the Pirates contended that CBRE was obligated to 
defend them based on the allegations in the Complaint. It does not appear, however, that 
they raised their estoppel argument before the District Court, and accordingly we will not 
consider it. “This court has consistently held that it will not consider issues that are raised 
for the first time on appeal.” Harris v. City of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). If, 
however, “a gross miscarriage of justice would occur” we may consider such an issue. 
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976) (citation 
omitted). We do not believe that this case presents such a situation, and accordingly we 
will not consider this argument here. 
V. 
Finally, the Pirates contend that we should uphold the grant of summary judgment 
on different grounds than those contained in the District Court‟s opinion. Although “[w]e 
may affirm a District Court's summary judgment ruling on different grounds, „provided 
the issue which forms the basis for our decision was before the lower court,‟” Nasir v. 
Morgan, 350 F.3d 366, 368 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Morse v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 904 n.1 (3d Cir.1998)), we are not required to do so, 
and we will not do so here. 
* * * * * 
 We decide that nothing in this opinion reflects matters that should be under seal. 
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed and the proceedings remanded for 
further consideration in accordance with the foregoing. 
 
  
